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Many developing countries pursue policies that treat large and small firms
differently.  For example,  large firms may be subject to a value added tax while
small  firms  are  explicitly  exempted.  Moreover,  governments  often  find  it
impractical  to collect  taxes  from  the smallest enterprises;  this  may  increase  the
tax burden  for  larger  firms,  whose  compliance  can be enforced.  Such policies
clearly affect the size distribution of firms.  But how great is the impact on macro
variables?  How large are the resulting inefficiencies?  And what are the dynamic
effects on capital accumulation and economic growth?  This paper uses a dynamic
general  equilibrium variant of the Lucas (1978)  span-of-control  model to address
such questions.  The model  is matched  to data from the Ghanaian manufacturing
sector.  As  a  policy  experiment,  alternative  tax  and  regulatory  regimes  are
compared.  The  model  shows  that a  policy  disproportionately  penalizing  large
firms  can reduce output by nearly one-half,  compared with an alternative policy
regime  in which all  firms  face  the same taxes  and regulatory  costs.
*Financial support for  field research  in Ghana  was  provided  by the  MacArthur  Program  for
International  Peace and  Cooperation at the University of Minnesota.  At various points in time,  this
research has benefitted  from comments by Tim Kehoe,  Ed Prescott,  Richard Rogerson, V.V.  Chari,
Vern Ruttan, Terry Roe, and numerous colleagues.  In Ghana,  generous time and advice were offered
by Ernest Aryeetey,  A. Baah-Nuakoh,  K. Tutu, and P.W.K.  Yankson,  along with  Theodora Chinery
and others.  Francis Teal of the Centre for Study of African Economies, Oxford University,  has kindly
provided unpublished  materials from a detailed  survey of small enterprises  in Ghana.Introduction
Many developing countries pursue policies that treat large and small firms
differently.  Tax rates,  labor regulations,  and  social security  contributions - to
name  a  few  examples  - may  differ  explicitly  with  firm  size.  In  addition,
selective policy  implementation  and enforcement  may create implicit or defacto
differences  in  the  environment  facing  large  and  small  firms.  For  example,
governments  often  find  it  impractical  to  collect  taxes  from  the  smallest
enterprises;  instead,  they  are  likely  to  set  higher  tax  rates  and  to  enforce
compliance  only among larger  firms. 1
Such policies  clearly affect the size distribution of firms.  But how great
is the impact on firm size?  How large are the resulting inefficiencies?  And  what
are the dynamic  effects  on capital  accumulation  and  economic  growth?
A number of authors  have  argued that discrimination against large  firms
forms  a major  obstacle to economic  growth.  De Soto (1989)  argues  that policy
distortions have  frustrated would-be entrepreneurs  in Peru, creating  a huge  mass
of  small  enterprises  and  constraining  them  to  the  "informal"  sector.  By
liberalizing its policies and eliminating unnecessary regulations, de Soto contends,
Peru  can  unleash  the  energies  of  its  informal  entrepreneurs,  allowing  their
businesses  to grow and  stimulating  the whole economy.
To date,  however,  little  analysis  has  attempted  to model  the  impacts  of
policies  discriminating  against  large  firms.  Numerous  studies  have  sought  to
measure  the  size of the  informal  sector  in  different countries,  but  these studies
have not attempted to quantify efficiency  losses or to assess dynamic implications.
To  provide  more  satisfying  answers,  it  is  necessary  to  use  a  richer
theoretical  framework.  This  paper  draws  on  a  dynamic  general  equilibrium
model to assess the importance of policies that impose different tax rates on firms
of  different  sizes.  The  model  is  based  on  the  span-of-control  framework
developed  by Lucas  (1978)  but adds a self-employment  technology  and explicit
1Many  rich countries also pursue  policies that have different effects on large  and  small firms;
however,  there is seldom the pronounced dualism between large and small firms that is characteristic
of poor countries.3.
dynamics.  As a quantitative experiment,  the parameters of the model are chosen
based on data  from  Ghana,  and  the model's predictions  are  then compared  with
Ghana's  firm  size  distribution  and  other  macro  variables.  The  current  policy
environment  is  then contrasted  with  an  alternative  scenario  in  which  taxes  and
regulatory costs are the same  for all business  establishments.  The model  shows
that the change in policies could lead to a large efficiency gain - nearly doubling
current levels of output - as well as encouraging more rapid capital accumulation
and growth.  Ghana offers  an interesting test of the model  because its  economy
is characterized  by extremely high levels of self-employment and small enterprise;
over  85  percent of the manufacturing  labor force is employed  in establishments
with fewer  than  10 workers  (Republic of Ghana  1989,  1991,  1993).
The first section of the paper summarizes de Soto's argument and briefly
reviews relevant literature.  Section  2 reports  selected data from  Ghana.  Section
3 presents a model  in  which differential  tax  rates on small and  large firms lead
to distortions  in the size  distribution of firms.  Section  4  describes  the selection
of parameters for a quantitative assessment of the model.  Section 5 compares the
output  of the  model  with  data  from  Ghana  and  presents  the  results  of policy
experiments.  Section  6  briefly  discusses  implications  for  policy,  along  with
directions  for further  research.
1.  Small Enterprises  and Government  Policies:
Alternative Views
In  most  poor  countries,  small  businesses  and  own-account  enterprises
dominate  economic  activity.2  Gollin  (1995)  builds  on  the  work  of  Little,
Mazumdar,  and Page  (1987)  to show that small  firms  account for  significantly
higher  percentages  of employment  and  output  in  poor  countries  than  in  rich
countries.
2Own-account  work is a  term  commonly used in national accounting  to refer  to various forms
of self-employment.4.
In  part,  the  relative  importance  of  small  enterprises  in  developing
countries reflects  the sectoral  composition of output - chiefly  the large share of
family  farming  in total  GDP.  Even within the  manufacturing  sector,  however,
survey data suggest that small establishments represent a more significant feature
of poor economies  than of rich ones.
Why are small enterprises so prevalent in poor countries?  One school  of
thought holds that structural  factors account for the pattern.  Kuznets  (1966),  for
example,  maintained  that  the transition  from  own-account  enterprises  to larger
firms was a fundamental  feature of economic development.  Similar views can be
found  in  the writings of many  early development economists,  including Rostow
(1960),  Lewis  (1965),  and  Hirschman  (1958),  not  to  mention  Marx  and  the
classical  economists.
More  recently,  however,  researchers  have  suggested  that  in  poor
countries,  the pervasiveness  of small  enterprises  may  owe  much to a desire  for
entrepreneurs  to avoid  costly taxes  and  regulations.  An informal  sector,  in this
view,  arises as a response to state actions that inhibit the growth and development
of small  enterprises.
1.1  The De Soto  Hypothesis
De  Soto  (1989)  is typical  of authors  who  have  argued  that government
policies and bureaucratic regulations effectively force enterprises into the informal
economy.  In  this view,  taxes,  labor  laws,  registration  fees,  and  similar  state
controls  affect  businesses  that are  visible  to the  state;  i.e.,  those  that  enter  the
formal  sector.  Where  the  costs of these  state  controls  are  high,  it  is  argued,
many  businesses  will  choose  to  remain  small,  informal,  and underground.  In
support of this  hypothesis,  de  Soto collected  data  on the costs  facing  Peruvian
entrepreneurs who wished to start or expand their businesses  in the formal sector.
In many cases,  the costs were substantial.  Subsequent work by other researchers
(e.g.,  Chickering and Salahdine  1991,  for  five countries  in Asia and the Middle
East) documents  similar disincentives  in numerous  other countries.5.
1.2  The Labor  Surplus Hypothesis
Other researchers maintain that small enterprises  in poor countries function
in a  dualistic  role.  Although  some  small  businesses  are  dynamic  and  growth-
oriented,  they suggest,  others may serve only to absorb surplus labor.  Following
the tradition of Lewis (1965),  Todaro (1969) and Harris and Todaro (1970),  these
authors  subscribe  to  the view  that  under  some  circumstances,  small  enterprises
"are  acting  as  a  sponge,  soaking  up  excess  workers  in  marginal  activities"
(Liedholm et al.,  1994). 3  Several  such studies have shown that one-person  firms
gain in efficiency  if they are able to expand  (Liedholm  and  Mead  1987;  Parker
and Torres  1994;  Parker et al.  1995).  The authors  usually  see  this as evidence
of limited  scale economies.
From  this  perspective,  there  may  be costs  associated  with  policies  that
cause enterprises  to remain small.  In fact, some researchers  have suggested that
structural adjustment programs undertaken  in Africa in the 1980s and  1990s may
have had  mixed effects on the small enterprise  sector (e.g.,  Parker  et al.  1995,
for five Sub-Saharan countries;  Sowa et al.  1992,  for Ghana).  While economic
and  financial  liberalization  have  improved  the  overall  business  climate,  it  is
argued,  these policies  have also driven workers out of the state sector and  other
previously  protected  industries,  forcing  them  to accept  lower  earnings  in  self-
employment.
1.3  Tax Policies  for Developing  Countries
In recent years,  a number of scholars have examined  the effects  on poor
countries  of particular  forms  of  taxation:  e.g.,  taxes  on  financial  assets  and
institutions  (Chamley  1991);  taxes on agricultural  land (Skinner  1991);  taxes  on
income earned through foreign direct investment (Shah and Slemrod  1991);  value
added taxation  (Gillis et al.  1990).  Most of these studies rely on static  models:
3This particular  quote was  used  to refer  to  small  rural  enterprises,  rather than  to  the  entire
population.  Other studies that typify this literature are Haggblade  and Liedholm (1992),  Liedholm and
Kilby (1989),  Daniels  (1994),  and Mead  (1994).6.
either partial  equilibrium approaches  or multi-sector applied  general  equilibrium
models.  As a result,  important dynamic  issues have  largely  been sidestepped.
In  general,  this  literature  supports  the  idea  that  tax  distortions  pose  a
consequential  impediment  to  efficiency  and  economic  growth.  Curiously,
however,  little research has addressed the specific issue of tax policies that distort
the  firm  size  distribution.  Recent  surveys  of  the  theory  on  tax  policies  for
developing  countries  (Newbery  and  Stern  1987;  Bird  and  Oldman  1990;  Gillis
1989; and Khalilzadeh-Shirazi  and Shah  1991a,  1991b) are silent on the question.
For example,  Newbery  (1987)  notes  that  one of the  "special  characteristics  of
developing  countries"  is  the  pervasiveness  and  importance  of  "small-scale
enterprises."  But  he  does  not  ask  whether  this  size  distribution  results  from
distortionary  tax policies.  Similarly,  several  authors  note  that  small  firms  are
typically taxed at different rates from  large firms,  but they offer no discussion of
the effects of such distortions.4
A  notable  exception  is  Rauch  (1991),  who  specifically  asks  how  a
minimum  wage  policy  might  influence  the  size  distribution  of  firms  in  a
developing country.  In Rauch's model,  firms with more than a given number of
employees  were  required  to  pay  a  minimum  wage  above  the  market-clearing
wage.  Rauch  interpreted  the  larger  firms  as  "formal"  and  the  smaller  as
"informal."  A  number  of comparative  static  results  were  obtained,  including
implications for differences  in the sizes differences between informal sector firms
and formal  sector firms.  Rauch also obtained comparative  static results showing
that a  higher  minimum  wage  would  raise  the  employment  threshold  at which
firms  would opt to switch  from  the informal  sector to the formal  sector.
4Such  discussion  as  does  occur  typically  is  concerned  with  the  use  and  implementation  of
presumptive  or "forfait"  rates of taxation  for small enterprises.  Under this system,  small enterprises
are not required  to keep detailed  tax records  or receipts,  but are  simply taxed at a presumptive  rate
- based for example on the type of enterprise,  the square  footage occupied,  etc.  Some authors have
asked  whether  such arrangements are administratively  sensible and whether  they result in adequate
collection.  However,  the  question of whether  this presents  a disincentive  for expansion is ignored.7.
1.4  Contributions  and  Limitations
The  existing  literature  has  thus  pointed  out  an  important  set  of
relationships between government policies and the size distribution of firms.  But
the  literature  offers  little clear  analysis  of the  issues;  instead,  it underscores  the
need for an analysis based on a coherent  macro theory of establishment size that
addresses  dynamic  issues  directly.  Such  an approach  can  allow us  to measure
gains or losses from policies that alter the size distribution of firms.
In  recent  years,  new  work  in  the  area  of  industrial  organization  -
combined with improved ability to compute solutions to these models - has made
it possible to design  such a model  and to use it for empirical  purposes.  Section
3  presents  such  a  model.  First,  however,  it  is  instructive  to  consider  some
background  data  from  Ghana.
2.  Small  Enterprises  in Ghana:
Data and Perspectives
Ghana  offers  an  interesting  test for any  theory  of self-employment  and
small business.  Household  survey and census data indicate that around 80 percent
of Ghanaians  are  either  self-employed  or work  without pay  in  family  business
(Republic  of Ghana  1987,  1989;  Doss  1995).  This  fraction  is extremely  high
relative  to the comparable  figures for other countries.  In the United  States,  for
example,  only  8.2  percent  of the workers  are  self-employed  or  unpaid  family
laborers  (International  Labor  Organization  1993).  Ghana's  totals  are  typical,
however,  of the figures reported in some other West African countries.  Liedholm
and Mead  (1986)  cite studies showing  that 95 percent or more of the small-scale
enterprises in Nigeria and Sierra Leone employ fewer than five individuals.  Self-
employment  in Burkina Faso accounted for 52 percent of the firms identified  in
one survey,  and the figure for Sierra Leone  was 42 percent (Chuta and Liedholm,
1985).  (See Appendix  1 for cross-country  comparisons.)
In part, the importance of small enterprises in these countries reflects the
sectoral  composition  of output:  the  agricultural  sector,  which  contributes  498.
percent of recorded GDP  in Ghana,  is composed almost entirely of small family-
run enterprises.  Even within  other sectors,  however,  small  enterprises  employ
large  shares  of workers  and  generate  substantial  fractions  of output.  Table  1
shows  the  forms  of  employment  by  sector  for  Ghana.  Within  Ghana's
manufacturing  sector,  Table  1 shows  that  73  percent  of  workers  are  self
employed;  Industrial Census data indicate that under  15 percent of the workforce
is employed  by establishments with  10 or more workers.  An observer  in Ghana
will  note  that  self-employed  workers  produce  a  wide  array  of manufactured
goods:  clothing  and  footwear;  clay  pots  and  metal  pans;  furniture  and
housewares;  farm tools  and processed  foods,  to name a few.
2.1  Small  enterprises and  value added
Do  these  enormous  numbers  of small  enterprises  make  any  substantial
contribution  to value  added?  Appiah-Koranteng  (1994)  reports  estimates  from
1963-74 showing  that the value added  in small-scale  manufacturing ranged  from
22-37  percent  of  sectoral  value  added;  the  source  of  these  estimates  is  not
identified.  The  same report  also  cites  data from  a  1989  survey  indicating  that
small  enterprises  accounted  for  28  percent  of  industrial  output.  Since  the
industrial  sector  is defined  to  include  mining  and  provision  of electricity  and
water,  as  well  as  manufacturing,  and  since  mining  and  utilities probably  have
relatively few  small firms, this suggests that small  enterprises  might account for
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This conclusion is reinforced by data from household surveys,  which show
that small non-farm  enterprises provide a large part of household  income.  Non-
farm self-employment  income was 24.3 percent of total household  income in the
first round of the Ghana Living Standards  Survey and  31.0 percent in the second
round  (Republic of Ghana  1989,  1993).'  If this  holds true  on the income  side,
it must  also  hold true  on  the production  side.  Although  it is impossible  to  be
precise,  small  enterprises  and  self-employment  probably  account  for  25-30
percent of value added for the economy  as a whole,  excluding agriculture.  Since
small-scale  enterprises  and  self-employment  seem  especially  prevalent  in
manufacturing,  it  is  reasonable  to  imagine  that  well  over  30  percent  of
manufacturing  output  may originate  in firms  with  fewer than  10 employees.
2.2  Policies affecting  small  enterprises
A wide range  of policies  affects  the size distribution of firms  in Ghana.
No  complete  inventory  of such  policies  has  been  undertaken.  In  addition  to
taxation,  Appiah-Koranteng  (1994)  points  out  a  partial  listing  of policies  that
implicitly  affect  firm  size:  provision  of  infrastructure;  monopolistic  or
monopsonistic  marketing  boards;  export  and  import  controls;  centralized
registration  and  licensing of enterprises;  regulatory  procedures;  and  controls  on
financial  institutions.  Parker  et  al.  (1995)  cite  "minimum  wage  laws  and
burdensome hiring and firing procedures" as important constraints on large formal
sector firms.
Given sufficient  information about such policies,  it would be possible  to
construct  and  compute  an  "effective  rate  of taxation"  that  would  measure  the
combined  effects of these policies on firms of different sizes. 6  No such measure
exists,  however,  and  it  is  not  possible  to  compute  it  from  available  data.
5Total  household income  included  the imputed value  of owner-occupied  housing as  well  as the
values  of in-kind wage  income,  food  produced  for  home  consumption,  and  home  consumption  of
output produced  by family businesses.
6Such a  measure  would  also  need  to include  extra-legal  costs,  such  as  bribes  and  kickbacks
demanded  by regulators.11.
Experience  from other countries  indicates  that taxation  may be only a small part
of the burden facing  large formal  sector firms.
The policy  environment  has  undergone  numerous  and  pronounced  shifts
since  Ghana  achieved  independence  in  1957.  Leith  (1974)  traces  changes  in
macroeconomic  policies and regimes through the early  1970s;  Stryker (1990)  and
Sowa  et al.  (1992)  offer detailed  analysis  of subsequent policy  changes.  These
policies  have  produced  marked  effects  on  economic  activity  and  growth,  and
Ghana's  economy has consequently  experienced  sharp swings.
2.3  Macroeconomic  environment
Ghana today ranks among the world's poorest countries,  with  1992 GDP
per  capita of $956,  according  to the Penn World  Tables  (v.  5.5).7  Agriculture
accounted for 49 percent of recorded  GDP, with  industry 17 percent and services
33 percent (Republic of Ghana  1994).  Main exports  include gold,  cocoa,  coffee,
and timber.
Between  1983  and  1989,  the  Ghanaian  economy  grew  in real  terms  by
5.27  percent annually  - although with  population  growth  of 3.48 percent  over
the same period, the per capita gains were a more modest  1.78 percent annually.8
Even with its relatively strong growth from  1983-89, Ghana remained poorer than
it  was  in  1955.  As  Figure  1 illustrates,  Ghana's  GDP per  capita in  1955  was
$840 and rose to an average of $987 in the years 1970-74 before falling to current
levels.9
In  spite  of  economic  fluctuations  and  policy  shifts,  the  small-scale
manufacturing  sector appears  to  have undergone modest changes.  Steel  (1977)
7This  figure  is  real  per  capita  GDP  in  terms  of  1985  U.S.  dollars,  with  output  valued  at
international prices (a form of purchasing power parity adjustment).  Thus, it differs from commonly
cited figures that use official exchange rates.  The figure for 1989 is the latest available  for Ghana in
the Penn World  Tables v. 5.6.
8It is important to note,  however, that  1983 was an extremely poor year  for Ghana.
9These  figures are drawn from the  Penn World  Tables  (v. 5.5).  By comparison,  South  Korea
in  1954 had a GDP  per  capita  of $820  - essentially  the  same as  Ghana  at that date.  Since  then,
however,  South Korea's GDP per  capita has grown to $6,209, while Ghana's  has fallen slightly.12.
conducted  the  first  detailed  study  of the  small-scale  manufacturing  sector  in
Ghana;  his  findings  remain remarkably  current.  Steel  reported  data  from  1970
indicating  that  the  "modern"  manufacturing  sector  employed  13.9  percent  of
manufacturing  workers,  compared  with  14.8  percent  in  data  from  1987.  Data
from 1963  indicated that small-scale manufacturing establishments generated 34.2
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Figure 1:  Ghana's real per capita GDP ($US  '000),  1955-89.  Source:  Penn
World Tables,  v.  5.5.
2.4  Previous  studies  in Ghana
This study draws on a number of surveys of small enterprises and related
studies  from  Ghana  that  have  been  undertaken  in  recent  years  (e.g.,  Appiah-
Koranteng  1994;  Aryeetey  et al.  1994;  Dordunoo  1994;  Sowa et al.  1992;  Steel
and Webster  1991; Stryker et al.  1990; Teal  1994 and  1995; Thomi and Yankson13.
1985).  These provide a rich source of primary data.  In addition, several rounds
of the Ghana Living Standards  Survey - a detailed  household survey - include
a great deal of indirect  information  about employment  and  income,  as  does the
1984  Census.  Finally,  the Industrial  Census  of  1987 reports complete  data  for
a relative handful  of large enterprises. 'o
Some  of these studies have  examined  institutions  and policies  relating to
small  enterprises.  Recent  work  by  Aryeetey  (1992)  and  Aryeetey  and  Steel
(1992) argues that credit market imperfections - specifically,  a dualism between
formal  and  informal  financial  institutions  - have  impeded  the  growth  and
development  of small  enterprises  in  Ghana.  Other  authors  (e.g.,  Sowa et  al.
1992;  Parker et al.  1995;  Steel  and Webster  1991)  examine  the effects on small
enterprises of Ghana's  Economic Recovery Programme,  initiated  in 1983,  which
liberalized  trade  and  exchange  rates,  removed  price  controls,  liberalized  the
financial sector, and reduced the size of government.  Finally, a few papers (e.g.,
Appiah-Koranteng  1994; Thomi and Yankson  1985) propose measures to promote
small-scale  manufacturing.  These  papers  are  valuable  sources  of  empirical
information on particular production  activities.  None of these studies,  however,
asks  to what extent the current patterns of firm  size  in  Ghana can be explained
by tax and regulatory policies.  The following  section presents  a framework for
analyzing  such questions.
3.  A Model  of Firm Size
under Distortionary Taxes
In  recent  years,  the  literature  on  industrial  organization  has  made
considerable  advances  in  modeling  heterogeneity  of  firm  size.  Previously,
classical  and  neoclassical  economists  tended  to  use  macroeconomic  models
characterized  by constant returns to scale - in which case optimal firm size was
not well  defined.
o°A  companion survey  of smaller enterprises  was not publicly available as of early  1995; it is
unclear how extensive  this survey was.14.
3.1  Previous models  of firm size
Viner  (1931)  developed  an  early  model  in  which  the  existence  of fixed
inputs forced cost-minimizing  firms  to seek an optimal  size.  Viner attempted  to
explain  differences  in firm size by assuming that capital  was variable  in the long
run,  and  that  firms  sought  (presumably  by  trial  and  error)  to attain  a long-run
cost-minimizing  position  by  balancing  economies  and  diseconomies  of scale.
Viner's  model,  however,  predicted  that within a given industry,  all firms should
tend towards  the same optimal  size.
Another  early contributor  to the  literature  on  firm  size and  growth  was
Gibrat (1931),  who developed the postulate (subsequently known as Gibrat's Law)
that firm size and growth  rates  are  independent.
Lucas  (1978)  developed  the  seminal  model  of an economy  with  a  size
distribution of firms.  This model is discussed  in greater detail below.  In Lucas's
model,  heterogeneity  in managerial  ability  among people  in  the economy  leads
some  people  to manage  businesses  while others  work for wages.  Gibrat's Law
is  assumed  to  hold  in  order  to  guarantee  existence  and  uniqueness  of  the
equilibrium.
Lucas's  model  gave  rise  to  a  number  of subsequent  papers  employing
related frameworks.  As a general rule,  all these models depend on heterogeneity
of some  fixed  factor of production,  which  is  inelastically  supplied.  Jovanovic
(1982)  models  firm growth  using a learning  framework  in which  firms attain an
optimal size over time.  This model  seeks to explain patterns of firm growth that
are associated  with firm age,  but does not necessarily  correlate firm growth with
firm  size.  Hornstein  and  Prescott  (1990)  extend  the  Lucas  model  to a general
equilibrium  framework,  and  Jovanovic  (1994)  generalizes  the  model  to  an
environment  in  which  people  are  heterogeneous  in  labor  quality  as  well  as  in
managerial  ability."
Evans  and  Jovanovic  (1989)  analyze  a model  in which  (heterogeneously
distributed) liquidity constraints determine the growth patterns of individual firms
lThe Hornstein and Prescott result also includes a number of convenient and widely-used results
that demonstrate the existence  and optimality of equilibrium  in Lucas-type models,  despite  apparent
non-convexities in household consumption  possibility sets and production possibility  sets.15.
and  generate  a distribution  over firm  size.  Hopenhayn  (1992)  uses exogenous
productivity  shocks,  which  affect  firm  size,  in a  model  of firm  entry  and exit
decisions  that  seeks  to  simulate  the  processes  of job creation  and  destruction.
Lloyd-Ellis  and  Bernhardt  (1994)  treat  inherited  wealth  as  a  source  of
heterogeneity  in a study of inequality  and entrepreneurship.
In  all  the  models  described  above,  the  firm  is  taken  to  consist  of an
entrepreneur  and a technology.  This is clearly an abstraction from firms as they
are  conceived  and  characterized  in  literature  on  business  and  management.
Although the Lucas framework can be modified to incorporate certain hierarchical
management  structures  (see,  for  example,  Proctor  1990),  it  remains  a
simplification.  In particular,  these models offer no motivation for the location of
production  inside  firms.  This  literature  is  well  developed  and  has  been
summarized  elsewhere  (see,  for  example,  Hart  and  Holmstr6m  1987,  or
Holmstrom  and Tirole  1985).
3.2  A model of firm size under distortionary  taxes
This  paper  analyzes  Ghana's  tax  policy  using  a  dynamic  general
equilibrium model  in which the distribution of firm size can evolve over time and
is  sensitive  to  policy  changes.  The  model  is based  on  Lucas  (1978),  but  it
extends  the  Lucas  framework to an infinite  time horizon  and explicitly  includes
consumers,  self-employed  people,  and tax policies.
There  is a single sector of the economy,  producing  one composite  good
which can be consumed  or used as capital.  People inhabiting this economy differ
only in  their entrepreneurial  ability.  In each period,  people can  choose among
three alternative  forms of employment:  wage  work,  self-employment,  and  full-
time  management.  Workers  receive  the  market  wage,  w,  while  full-time
entrepreneurs  receive the rents from operating a firm.  The self-employed  divide
their time between direct production activities and entrepreneurial  activities; they
receive some rents  as  well  as a return  to time  spent  in production.  Individuals
make their  employment  decision  in  such a way as  to maximize  earnings  (since
they are indifferent,  in terms of utility, between  the three  uses of their time.16.
In  equilibrium,  people  with  high  levels of entrepreneurial  ability  have  a
comparative advantage  in full-time management  of firms; people with  low levels
of entrepreneurial  ability have a comparative advantage in wage work,  and people
with  intermediate  levels of entrepreneurial  ability have  a comparative  advantage
in self-employment.
This model  has a number of attractive features.  In  addition  to  imitating
some of the observed patterns  in the size distribution of firms,  it lends itself well
to empirical  work.  It is straightforward  to collect  a variety  of macroeconomic
data  on  the  model  economy,  which  can be  compared  against  data  from  actual
economies.  The  following paragraphs  describe the model  in more detail.
3.2.1  Environment
Formally,  the  environment  is  characterized  by  the  following  features.
There  is a measure one of infinitely-lived people,  who are indexed on the interval
[0,1] by entrepreneurial  ability, x.  There  is a distribution A(x)  over skill types.
3.2.1.1  Preferences  and endowments
People  in  the  model  economy  have  identical,  preferences  defined  over
their  lifetime consumption  streams  {c,(x)}  by:
tro U  = E  Pu(c ))  ()
t=O
In addition  to skills,  individuals  are  endowed  with  one unit of labor  in
each  time  period,  which  is  supplied  inelastically;  and  with  ko  units  of  initial
capital,  also supplied  inelastically.17.
3.2.1.2 Technology:  full-time entrepreneurs
At each  date,  a single  good  is  produced;  this  can be consumed  or saved
as capital  to be  used  in the next time period.  The production  process  involves
three  factors:  labor,  capital,  and  entrepreneurial  ability.  Following  Lucas's
original  notation,  production  can be  imagined  to  consist of both an  underlying
physical  technology  and  a  managerial  technology.  The  underlying  physical
technology is  denoted f(n,k),  while the managerial  technology  is written as g(v).
Specifically,  an individual of type x who is a full-time manager of a firm with n
workers and k units of capital  at date t produces  output:
y  = xg[f(n,(x), k(x))] (2)
where f  is constant  returns  to scale,  increasing,  and  concave  in each  argument;
and where g is continuously twice differentiable,  increasing,  and strictly concave,
with g(0)=0.  For analytic  purposes,  I will restrict  my attention  to a class  of
functions  where g is a power function  in the form g(v)=Ave,  where 0<0<1.12
2Lucas  (1978)  shows  that this functional  form is necessary  and sufficient  for Gibrat's Law  to
hold.  Gibrat's Law holds that the size of a firm is not related  to its growth rate.  Although there is
considerable debate over the empirical validity of the law, it provides a useful simplifying assumption
in this framework.18.
3.2.1.3  Technology:  self-employed people
In  the model  world,  people  may  instead choose  to  operate single-person
enterprises;  i.e.,  to engage  in self-employment. 13  In  this case,  they may  divide
their time between physical  labor,  n, and entrepreneurial  or administrative  time,
(1 - n). 14  Since  they  are  using  less  than  one  unit of time  for  entrepreneurial
responsibilities,  these  single-person  enterprises  experience  a  lower  degree  of
entrepreneurial  efficiency.  In  particular,  the  entrepreneurial  factor x  is scaled
down to (1 - n)O x.  When time  spent in production,  n, is very small,  then there
is  only  a  modest decline  in  entrepreneurial  efficiency.  Alternatively,  when
approaches  zero,  then there  is little loss  in entrepreneurial  efficiency  from self-
employment.
Formally,  an individual  of type x who  is self-employed  produces  output
according  to the production  function:
y  = (1 - n,(x))*xg[f(n,(x), k,(x))]  (3)
3.2.1.4  Government  and taxes
There  is a government  in  this  model,  which collects  taxes  r from firms
and  converts  them  into  a  composite  government  good,  G,,  which  enters
production  and  consumption  in  a perfectly  separable  manner  and  thus  has  no
impact on equilibrium  outcomes.  The tax schedule  for firms has three tiers.
3In the  original  Lucas  model,  self-employment  is not  an option;  an individual's  entire  time
endowment  must  be  used to manage  a  firm, regardless  of firm size.  Self-employment  would  thus
correspond  to a situation  with no labor input, which is never optimal.
14We  could  imagine  that  this  time  is  spent  forming  contracts  with  suppliers  and  customers,
participating  in trade  associations  (which are ubiquitous  in Ghana;  even the  informal moneylenders,
or susu operators have their own trade association),  making credit transactions,  and performing other
tasks that are important for enterprise operation but do not involve directly productive  activities.19.
Tax rates are:
To  for the self-employed
T 1   for firms  with n  ￿  n*
'72  for firms  with n  > n'
Thus,  there  are  two  thresholds  in  the tax  code:  between  self-employment  and
small firms,  and between  firms with  fewer than n' workers  and  those with more
than n' workers.
3.2.2  Individual's problem
An individual  in this economy  must choose  the type of employment  that
will  maximize  his  or  her  income.  The  returns  from  working  for a  wage  are
simply w,  which  the  individual  takes  as  given.  The  individual  compares  this
wage  with  the  income  derived  from  self-employment  and  from  full-time
management,  and  chooses  the occupation that gives  the highest  income.
3.2.2.1  Income from self-employment
The returns from self-employment consist of entrepreneurial  rents as well
as  the  market  value  of time n  devoted  to  production.  Thus,  a  self-employed
individual  earns  r;(x), where this  income includes  wages as well as  rents:
TOet()  =  maxn,  (1  - ro)( 1 - n)  x g [f(n,(x),  k m (x))] - rak,(x)  (4)
s.t.  k  >  0  and
Note  that  n and  k  depend  on  the  individual's  level  of entrepreneurial
ability, x.  In equilibrium,  individuals  with sufficiently  low levels ofx will prefer20.
wage work to self employment,  and  individuals with sufficiently high  levels of x
will prefer full-time  management.  (See  PROPOSITION  1, below.)
3.2.2.2  Income  from full-time management
An individual who operates a firm as a full-time manager will receive only
the  entrepreneurial  rents.  These  increase  with  the  individual's  level  of
entrepreneurial  ability, x,  so that those  with  low values of x will  not in general
choose  to be full-time  managers.
Given x, the would-be manager chooses  levels of labor and capital  inputs
to  maximize  rents.  This  is a  straightforward  problem  except  for the distortion
created by tax policy:  the tax rate that the manager will face depends on the level
of labor input.  Thus,  the full-time  manager's  income is given by:
7,rf(x)  =  max(n,  (1 - r) x g [f(n,(x),  kr(x))]  - wn,(x) - rkc m(x)  (5)
s.t.  n, k  > 0 and
7 =  r, if n  _<  n*
r2  if n  >  n*
3.2.2.3  Consumer's  problem
Having chosen an employment option to maximize  income,  the individual
faces  a  straightforward  problem  in  allocating  this  income  to  current-period
consumption  and to savings.
Denote the individual's  maximum  income from employment  as:
,(x)  =  Lmax  {  w, T,(x),  r  F(x) }  (6)
The  individual's  decision  rules  can be represented  by marker  functions.
Let  m,(x)  =  1  if  the  individual  earns  maximum  income  from  full-time
management,  and  let  m,(x)  =  0  otherwise.  Similarly,  let  s,(x)  =  1 if  the21.
individual  earns  maximum  income  from  self-employment,  and  let  s,(x)  =  0
otherwise.
The problem of a consumer  with entrepreneurial  ability x can be written
as:
max  j  'tu(c,(x))
Ct,  k÷1 ,  mt  t=O
s.t.  c,(x)  + k(S(x)  I  (1  +  rt  - 8)k(x)  + xt(x)
ct(x),  kI(x)  2 0  V  t
3.2.3  Equilibrium
An equilibrium  for this economy consists of sequences  of:
{c,(x),  n,(x),  k/(x),  km (x),  w, r,  y,(x),  m,(x),  s,(x)},  t  =  0,1,2,  ...
VxE [0,1]
such that:
(i)  The consumer's  problem  is solved for all  individuals x e [0,1].
(ii)  All establishments  are  maximizing profits,  taking prices as given.
(iii)  The  usual feasibility  conditions are satisfied,  for all t; namely,22.
The  market-clearing  condition  for the goods market is given by:
1  1
fc,(x)  dAf(x)  + f,(x)  dA(x)  +  G,
0  0
1  1
Sfm,(x) x g[f(n,(x),  k,(x))  ]  dA (x)  + (1 - 6) fks(x)  dA (x)  (8)
0  0
1
+ fs,(x) x (  - n)*g [f(nt(x),  k(x))]  dA (x)
0
Market-clearing  in the wage labor market requires  that:
1  1
fn,(x) dA (x)  - fs(x)n,(x) dA (x)
o  0  (9)
1
f(1  -m,(x))(1  - s(x))  dA(x)
0
The  market for capital  services clears  when:
1  1
f  0(x)  dx  0  kef  (x) dx  (10)
0  023.
Finally,  the government  budget is balanced  when:
1
G,  =  m,(x)xg [f(n(x), k(x))dA (x)
1  (11)
+ f  { 0s,(x)x(1  - n)* glf(n,(x),k,(x))] dA (x)
0
where  7  =  fT/  if n  n*
r2 if n  >  n
The  structure  of  the  model  immediately  implies  that  people's  work
choices,  m,(x) and s,(x),  will be (weakly) monotonic in x;  in other words,  at each
date,  there will be two  cutoff levels  of entrepreneurial  ability  z,,  and z,  E [0,1]
such  that everyone  with a  skill  level  below z , will  work,  and  everyone  with a
skill  level  above  z,  will  be  a  full-time  manager,  while  individuals  with
intermediate  levels  of entrepreneurial  ability  (i.e.,  x  e [zI,  zz 2 )  will  be  self-
employed.  This can be expressed  more formally as:
PROPOSITION  1:
At each date t, if there are  both self-employed people and  full-time
managers in equilibrium, then 3z,, zz, E  [0,1]  such that:
m,(x)  =  1  for all x  >  zz  and
m(x)  =  0 for all  x  <  z2,  while
s,(x)  =  1  for all z 1 , < x  <  z,  and
s,(x)  = 0 elsewhere.
The proof of this  proposition  follows  directly  from  the  fact that
7r,(x)  is  increasing  in x.24.
It is  worthwhile  to note,  however,  that for  some parameter  values,  there
may  be  no  self-employed  people  in  the  economy.  Alternatively,  for  some
parameterizations,  there  may be  no full-time  managers.
3.3  Computing the equilibrium
The competitive equilibrium  for this problem is somewhat complex,  since
at  any  date  t,  individuals  x  earn  different  incomes  and  face  different  budget
constraints.  The  solution  is simplified,  however,  since  all  consumers  have
identical,  homothetic  preferences,  and  since  they  differ  only  in  income.  By
standard  aggregation  theorems,  this  implies that the competitive equilibrium  has
the  same  prices  and  aggregate  consumption  as  an  alternative  model  with  a
representative  consumer.  This  allows  us  to  abstract  from  the  consumption
decisions  of individuals  in  the  economy,  although  on  the  production  side,  it
remains  important  that  individuals  of  different  entrepreneurial  ability  choose
employment and  allocate their labor optimally.
A  convenient  way  to  compute  the  equilibrium  with  a  representative
consumer  is  to  begin  with  the  period-by-period  problem  of  solving  for  the
aggregate  output obtained  from any  level of aggregate  capital  stock.  Even with
a government  good,  this  is a straightforward  competitive  problem:  capital  and
labor  must  be  allocated  across  firms  in  such  a  way  as  to  equalize  marginal
products.  From each entrepreneur's  perspective,  the taxes  simply appear as part
of the technology;  the entrepreneur  chooses  which  technology  to operate - the
self-employment technology,  the full-time technology  with a tax rate of rl, or the
full-time  technology  with  a  tax  rate of r2. For  either  tax  rate,  the choice  of
capital  and labor must be efficient.
As a practical  matter,  it is computationally  intensive but not conceptually
difficult  to solve  this  single-period  problem.  Given  a wage,  w,  rental  rate  for
capital  services,  r, and  the  tax  rates,  it  is  simple  to  find  the  marginal  self-
employed person,  zz,  and the marginal full-time  manager, z2, assuming that both
exist.  Thus,  it  remains  only  to  search  for  the  wage  and  rental  rate  at  which
markets clear.  This  is straightforward.25.
The solution to the single-period problem can be obtained for any start-of-
period capital  stock.  This effectively defines a map from aggregate capital stock
into aggregate  production,  which can be denoted  as F(K).  Given this production
function,  the representative  consumer's problem takes  on a standard  form;  it can
be written  as a simple dynamic  program:
V(K)  = max  u(F(K) + (1-  )K  - K')  + (  (K/)
K'  (12)
s.t.  0  < K'  < F(K)  + (1-8)K
To compute solutions  for the model,  functional  forms must be specified.
In keeping with the literature,  this paper takes u(x) =  log(x).  For the production
technology, it usesf(n, k)  = [yn"  +  (1 - 7)  kf']i,  which is a standard CES form.
As noted  above,  g(v) is assumed to take the form av,  where 0 <  0  <  1.  Given
these functional  forms,  the next problem is to assign plausible parameters  for the
purposes of policy analysis.
4.  Matching  the model to data
In  most of the  literature  on  calibrated  growth  models  (e.g.,  Cooley  and
Prescott  1995),  time series data from the U.S.  or other OECD countries  is used
to pin down  the steady-state  values of parameters.  There are  several problems
in applying the same calibration  approach to Ghanaian  data.
First,  key  elements  of aggregate  data  are  not available  for  Ghana.  In
particular,  no  consistent  time  series  is  available  for  the  National  Income  and
Product Accounts (NIPA).  Only selected years are available, and as noted above,
the NIPA have limited value  for this study.  Moreover,  the NIPA as collected  in
Ghana  do  not include  GDP by  its cost components.  Thus,  wage shares,  rental
income,  and other such variables  are  not obtainable from  the Ghanaian  NIPA.26.
Second,  most calibration exercises rely on steady-state (or balanced-growth
path)  conditions  of the  model  to  determine  parameters  from  the  data.  As  a
conceptual  matter,  however,  there  is no  reason  to  believe  that  the  Ghanaian
economy  is now at a steady  state or on a balanced growth path.  (Note Figure  1,
above,  and  its  representation of the time series  for GDP per capita.)
For both  reasons,  I have departed  from  standard  calibration  procedures.
I have relied on survey data from the Ghanaian manufacturing  sector,  rather than
NIPA  data,  to  determine  parameters,  and  I  have  not  attempted  to  model  the
Ghanaian economy  as being at a steady  state.
The  result  should  be considered  less  a  calibration,  in  the  sense  that  is
usually  understood,  and  more  a quantitative  assessment of the  model.  A  full-
fledged calibration  would  attempt  to match  economy-wide  data  in a  number of
dimensions;  this quantitative assessment,  in contrast, aims at a narrower range of
targets.15  The  goal  is  to  use  parameter  values  taken  from  data  and  from
literature  and  to  see  how  well  the  model  matches  important  facts  about  small
enterprises  and self-employment  in Ghana's  manufacturing  sector.  If the model
reproduces  important  features  of the actual  economy,  it can be used  for policy
experiments,  such as an exploration of the effects of alternative  tax regimes.
4.1  Assigning  parameter  values
The  model  has  ten  parameters.  Of these,  a number  can  be taken  from
sources  such  as the  1987  Ghanaian Industrial  Census (Republic of Ghana  1991)
or from surveys of small enterprises  such as those sponsored  by the World Bank
Regional  Programme  on  Enterprise Development  in  1992 and  1993.  The  latter
survey has been analyzed extensively by Teal et al.  (1994,  1995),  among others.
I5In particular, a full-fledged calibration would seek to replicate observations of output, growth,
investment,  factor  shares,  employment  levels,  and  other variables  of interest  for studying  business
cycles or growth.27.
Parameters  of the model  are:
The  parameters  p,  7,  and  0  can  be  taken  or  derived  from  available
literature.  In  particular,  Teal  (1995)  presents  several  alternative estimates  of
elasticities  of substitution between  K and L.  Using  a  CES  specification  of the
production  function,  he  arrives at four alternative estimates  of a,  ranging  from
0.43  to  1.13  and averaging  0.78.'6  Allowing  for firm  fixed  effects  and  using
differenced  equations,  rather than level  equations,  Teal arrives at an estimate of
0.86.  This appears to  be  the  most  convincing  estimate of  a,  although  all  four
1 "Interestingly,  this  average  falls  comfortably within the range  of 0.5 to 0.8 that Lucas  (1969)
advocates.  It is also worth noting that these figures are broadly  consistent with the estimates obtained
by Baah-Nuakoh  (1981),  although Baah-Nuakoh's  estimates were  on average slightly lower.
Parameters  of the Model
A  scaling  constant
i  discount factor
y  labor share  in CES production
function
6  depreciation  rate
0  exponent on power  function;
corresponds to combined  labor and
capital  share in total output
p  parameter indicating elasticity  of
substitution (a=  1/(l-p))
~  exponent on managerial  time of
self-employed  people
ro, 7T,  72  tax  rates on different sized  firms
A(x)  Distribution of managerial  skill28.
estimates  are within  the plausible  range.  It  implies  a value  of p  =  - 0.1628.
Teal's estimates reflect the first-order condition of the CES model;  namely, that:
(kP-1  =  ()(  (  y)  (13)
I  w  l-y
Taking  logs,  this gives:
In  )  (  )In(  )  +  1  )In(r)  (14)
1  1-p  l-y  1-p  w
The  constant  term  from  this  estimation  equation  thus  gives  the  share
parameter 7 as  well as the elasticity of substitution.  The values  obtained  in this
way  from  the  estimations  reported  by  Teal  et  al.  give  the  labor  share,  7,  as
between 0 and  0.6.  For a = 0.86,  the corresponding  value  is 7y=0.532.
Taking estimates of p and  7 together,  it is possible to derive the  implicit
entrepreneurial  share  0.17  The  challenge  in  determining  entrepreneurial  share
is that it is difficult,  in the data,  to separate these rents from capital  income.  But
equation (13)  indicates the firm-level relationship between capital income (rk) and
labor  income  (w).  Turning  from  the  firm-level  data  used  by  Teal  to  the
aggregate  data  from  the  Industrial  Census,  it  is  possible  to  obtain  aggregate
figures  for  labor  and  capital  shares.  This  aggregated  data  gives  reasonable
numbers for L, the number of persons engaged  in manufacturing.  Then w is the
total employee  compensation  in manufacturing  (wages  plus benefits)  divided by
the  number  of persons  engaged.  Since K can be approximated  as  the value  of
fixed assets  in manufacturing,  and since 7 is given from the  literature,  equation
(13)  can be solved  for an average  value of r.  From this,  rK can be computed;
and  given  wL  and rK,  the  third  factor  share  (profits)  can  be determined  as  a
17Note that 0 corresponds to the share of output that goes to labor and capital.  Thus, (1-0) is the
share of output  retained as entrepreneurial  rent.29.
residual  from  sectoral  value  added.  Using  a=0.86  and  7y=0.523,  we  get
0=0.7817.  This seems plausible for the share of value added accruing  to capital
and  labor together;  it implies  that entrepreneurial  rents  are  about 21  percent  of
total  output.
The scaling constant A can be calibrated  to match aggregate output levels.
The drawback to this approach  is that aggregate  output and capital  stock are not
entirely  visible  in  the  data:  for  the  smallest  establishments  (including  single-
person  enterprises),  neither  capital  nor  output  is  well  measured.  It  is also
possible,  however,  to  determine  A from  the  data  for  entrepreneurs  with  any
particular  skill  level x.  For any  given firm managed  by an  individual with skill
level x,  the model  tells us that:
_0  (15)
y(n,k;x)  = xA[yn(x) P  + (1 - y)k(x) P ]
Ideally, a median or average value of x would be used to determine A. In
Ghana, however,  data limitations militate a different choice:  the use of data from
the Industrial Census on the largest size class of firms.  These data lead us to set
A =  1.46.
The results of the  model are not particularly  sensitive to the choice  of 6
and  3. A value of 5=0.072 can be obtained by using the Industrial Census figure
for depreciation  over  the  book  value  of fixed  assets.  For  lack  of any  better
figure,  I take #=0.95, with a period defined as one year.  In fact,  it seems likely
that a  lower  value of #  would  be justified  in  a  poor country  like  Ghana,  but
preliminary tests  indicate that the model  results are not very sensitive to changes
in 8.
Two  more  parameters  are  essentially  unobservable.  First  is  the  skill
distribution,  A(x).  For simplicity, this  is taken to be lognormal,  in keeping  with
much of the  literature on firm size distributions  (e.g.,  Simon and  Bonini  1958).
The parameters of the distribution are IA=0.35 and a=0.04, and with the support
scaled  into the [0,1]  interval so that essentially all of the mass is contained  in the
interval.  The  small  amount  of truncated  mass  is added  on  as  a constant  term
across the whole  interval.30.
Another  unobserved  parameter  is  the  self-employment  efficiency
parameter,  {.  The model  is sensitive to large changes  in this parameter but not
to  marginal  changes.  This  parameter  determines  the  relative  entrepreneurial
inefficiency  of self-employed people;  in other words,  the degree to which they are
less  efficient  managers  or  entrepreneurs  because  they  must  divide  their  time
among  several  tasks.  Given  the high  amount of self-employment  in  Ghana,  it
seems  that  self-employment  cannot  be  greatly  disadvantaged.  This  supports
choosing  a low value  for  10  (i.e.,  close to zero).  I have used a value of 0.025  in
this quantitative assessment;  small  changes  (say, between 0.01  and 0.10) appear
to have little effect.
Finally,  the tax  rates  ro,  rl,  and r2 are  the subject of policy experiments.
The choice of these  rates is discussed  in detail  in the next section.
4.2  Tax rates  for the model  economy
The  taxes  in  the  model  economy  represent  "effective  rates"  of tax  and
subsidy,  in  the sense that  they aggregate the  effects of all  government policies.
Since  it  is  difficult  or  impossible  to  inventory  all  of Ghana's  policies  and  to
convert them  into effective rates of taxation,  I have  initially used guesses  based
on my  reading  of the data.  The Industrial  Census  gives  indirect business  taxes
paid by the  largest firms  in the  economy.  But these are only formal  taxes;  the
actual tax burden faced  by large firms may be much higher.  Evidence  from other
countries  suggests  that  taxes  are  only  a  small  fraction  of  total  costs  due  to
compliance  with policies  and  regulations.
For example,  in  Peru,  researchers  at the Instituto Libertad  y Democracia
(ILD)  estimated  that, for a sample of small industrial  firms,  taxation comprised
only  22  percent  of  the  total  cost  of  compliance  with  laws  and  regulations.
Utilities  represented  an  additional  5  percent  of these  costs;  the  remaining  73
percent  was primarily  due to time costs associated  with  regulatory  compliance.
(De Soto  1989,  offers  a detailed  account of this research.)
The  Peruvian  example  suggests  that  official  tax  rates  may  be  a  poor
indicator of the total  effective  rate of taxation  faced  by firms of different sizes.
Nonetheless,  for Ghana,  tax rates  offer  a useful  starting  point.  The  Industrial31.
Census of 1987  includes data on total indirect  taxes paid by large manufacturing
firms - including custom duties,  excise duties,  and sales taxes.  These amounted
to about 28 percent of value added for large firms.  Assuming  for simplicity that
indirect taxes reflect half the indirect taxes  for large firms,  this  suggests a value
for r2 of 0.56.18
No comparable  figures  show  the tax  burden  small  establishments.  Data
from  household  surveys  and  from  surveys  of enterprises  usually  indicate  that
formal  taxation is  close to zero.  Smaller  firms  undoubtedly  pay some  licensing
and regulatory fees,  however,  along  with some bribes and  kickbacks,  and  other
bureaucratic overheads.  Many  small establishments occupy permanent structures
(79-85  percent  in Accra in  1989-91,  according  to Appiah-Koranteng  1994),  and
thus  can be located  by agents  of various government entities.  The  survey  also
showed  that  37  percent  of  firms  with  1-5  workers  were  registered  with  the
government,  compared with 78 percent of those with 6-49 workers (Parker et al.
1995).  Moreover,  many proprietors  of small  establishments  belong  to business
associations which are quasi-formal entities; this may also expose them to certain
taxes and fees,  in exchange for the benefits gained from political lobbying power.
Thus,  it seems  clear that the  effective  taxation  rate  on small  firms  is  probably
greater than zero but somewhat  lower than the level faced by large firms.  I find
that an effective tax rate of 0.5 provides the best fit with the data,  and this  is the
value  used in the quantitative assessment.
Finally, it is unclear to what extent the self-employed in the manufacturing
sector  face tax or regulatory burdens.  In many  cases,  these individuals  may  be
able  to avoid  taxes altogether;  certainly  there are  some regulations  (e.g.,  social
security payments and other labor laws) that are faced by firms that formally  hire
any employees.  Thus,  we should expect the self-employed to face the lowest tax
rates of all.  For the purposes of this quantitative assessment,  I take  To  = 0.
It should  be  noted  that  Ghana's tax  structure  has  recently  changed.  In
early  1995,  Ghana imposed a value added tax (VAT) designed to replace previous
indirect  taxes.  As  is  common  for  developing  countries,  the  VAT  explicitly
l8Marsden  and  B61ot  (1987)  report that  the  tax  rate  on corporate  income  in Ghana  was  60
percent,  but they  do  not provide  a  date  or  source,  nor  do they  make  it  clear whether  this was  a
marginal or an average tax rate.32.
exempted  small  firms,  as measured  by a sales  threshold."  The  new  tax policy
will  alter the environment for firms of different sizes,  but it will  not change  the
basic impact of the tax  system on firms of different  sizes.  Large establishments
will  continue  to pay  higher  rates  than  small  establishments,  which  in  turn  will
face higher rates than self-employed  people.
5.  Results  of quantitative  assessment
and policy  experiment
The quantitative assessment is designed to test whether the model provides
a useful representation of the Ghanaian economy and,  if so, to explore the effects
of alternative tax regimes.
5.1  How well  does the  model  match the actual economy?
A question of particular  interest for the quantitative assessment  is whether
the model  accurately  matches  the actual  size distribution of firms  in Ghana.  To
answer  this  question,  it  is  necessary  to  construct  the  actual  distribution  by
assembling different sources of data.  Most available surveys truncate either large
firms or small firms,  depending on their objectives.  For example,  the Industrial
Census does not include firms with fewer than  10 employees;"  in contrast,  some
researchers  perform  surveys  that explicitly  focus on  "small-scale"  enterprises.
19However,  given  the  structure  of a  VAT,  it  may  still  prove  worthwhile  for  many  small
establishments to register for the VAT,  so that they can be credited  for the taxes paid to suppliers.
2A companion volume to the Industrial Census was designed to survey firms with fewer than 10
employees.  Its  coverage,  however,  was  extremely  limited  and  some of the  data are  particularly
dubious.33.
5.1.1  Computing the actual  size distribution  of firms
According  to the Population Census,  self-employment  is a major  feature
of the  firm  size distribution.  Of the 451,299  entrepreneurs  and  self-employed
people in the manufacturing sector, 430,029 reported that they had no employees,
while 21,270 had some  employees.  Manufacturing  employees  in the public and
private  sector numbered  93,103.  Together  with 44,016  unpaid family  workers
and  "others,"  this gives a total of 137,119 potential workers  for enterprises of all
size.  If these workers were divided evenly among the 21,270 entrepreneurs-with-
employees  listed  in the census  data,  it would  give an average  firm size  of 6.45
workers.  The Industrial  Census  reports,  however,  that the largest  1,258  firms
employ  87,577 people.  Thus,  49,542 people  work for 20,012 employers  in the
remaining firms,  for an average of 2.48 workers  (not counting entrepreneurs)  per
enterprise  in  establishments  with  fewer  than  10  employees. 21  As  a  matter  of
arithmetic,  this implies that the vast majority of these firms employed either  1 or
2 persons,  with very few employing  5-10.
A complete  size  distribution of firms  can be obtained  by combining  this
information  with  survey  data  from  micro  studies.  For  example,  Thomi  and
Yankson (1985)  found,  in a survey of small-scale industries in small and medium-
sized  towns  in  Ghana,  that  a  typical  entrepreneur  had  2.63  employees
(comfortingly  close to the figure obtained above).  In particular,  they found  the
following  proportions of firms with small  numbers  of employees:
1 employee  .190
2 employees  .094
3 employees  .054
4 employees  .033
21Note that this assumes - admittedly  unrealistically  - that there is one entrepreneur  for each
of the firms in the Industrial Census.  This is undoubtedly a simplistic assumption; some of these firms
are quasi-public  or parastatal  and may have no "entrepreneurs" in the sense of the model;  others may
be partnerships or corporations with complex management and ownership  structures.  For simplicity,
however,  this seems to be a plausible way to interpret the data.34.
These  ratios  are  not  consistent  with  the  Population  Census.  The  ratios
imply that self-employed  people account for at most 63 percent of the firms.  But
if self-employment  accounts for 63 percent of the firms,  it must represent an even
smaller proportion of the workforce,  since the remaining 37 percent of the firms
employ  larger  numbers  of people.  This conflicts  with  the  Population  Census
data,  which show  that self-employed  people are 73 percent of workers.
The two sets of data can be reconciled  by using the ratios that Thomi and
Yankson  found  but  scaling  the  numbers  down  to  fit  the  census  data.  This  is
equivalent to assuming that Thomi and Yankson undercounted  the self-employed,
which  is  not implausible,  since the self-employed  are notoriously hard to count.
From the combined data,  the following size distribution of firms emerges:
Table  2:  Actual  size  distribution of  firms  in  Ghana,




number of  Share of  (including  Share of
firms  total firms  entrepreneurs)  workers
Self-employed  430,029  0.9488  430,029  0.7308
1 employee  10,290  0.0227  20,581  0.0350
2 employees  5,093  0.0112  15,278  0.0260
3 employees  2,917  0.0064  11,669  0.0198
4 employees  1,804  0.0040  9,020  0.0153
5-9 employees  1,830  0.0040  13,722  0.0233
10+  employees  1,258  0.0028  87,577  0.1488
Source:  author's estimates  from census data and  Thomi and  Yankson,  1985.
Although  these  figures  are  not  exact,  they  provide  a  plausible
approximation of the firm size distribution based on available data.  Two features
of the data are striking.  First, self-employment accounts for well over 90 percent35.
of firms,  as well  as  almost three-quarters  of total  employment.  Firms with  1-3
employees  account  for  about  8 percent  of employment,  with  very  large  firms
(over  10  employees)  accounting  for  11  percent  of employment.  Interestingly,
these largest firms average around  70 employees.
5.1.2  Size distribution of firms:  model  vs. actual
In  several  respects,  the  calibrated  model  appears  to  do  a  good job  of
replicating the size distribution of firms in manufacturing.  Taking the present-day
ratio of capital  to output  in  Ghanaian  manufacturing  as 2,  the model  predicts  a
size distribution  of firms  that  is  exceptionally  close  to the actual  distribution. 22
(See Figure  2.)
More  detailed  analysis  reveals  some  disparities  between  the  model
economy and  the data:  the model  predicts  fewer  firms with 0-2  employees  than
are shown in the data, while also predicting more firms with 3-5 workers than are
shown in the data.  This stems from the fact that,  in the model economy,  almost
all  the people  who might  otherwise operate  enterprises  with  0-2 employees  are
better off remaining  self-employed and facing a lower tax rate.  In the data,  this
gap  is  not so pronounced - possibly because,  in reality,  the higher  tax rates do
not bind precisely  when a firm begins  to hire employees.  If, for example,  there
is  an  additional  margin  for  tax  evasion,  then  some  establishments  with  0-2
employees  might enter the sector  in spite of the putatively  higher tax burden.
Nonetheless,  the comparison  suggests that  the model  does a good job of
matching  the  size distribution  of firms.  This suggests  that  its output  can offer
some insights  for analyzing  the effects of alternative  tax regimes.
22This K/Y  ratio is an approximation,  since no figures of any kind are available for the capital
stock in Ghana.  It is possible to construct a measure of K using the investment time series  from the
national  accounts,  but  this  omits  capital  held  by  small  enterprises,  self-employed  people,  and
households.  The choice of K/Y here is prompted  by some attempts to construct a measure from the
data.  The model results are not particularly  sensitive to the choice,  although of course it affects  the

















































5.2  Conducting a policy experiment:  neutral  taxes
One  obvious  policy  experiment  is to  consider  the  effects  of switching
Ghana's tax system to one which imposes the same tax rate on all establishments,
regardless of size.  Under  such a policy,  the self-employed  would pay the same
tax  rate as small  firms,  and  both  would pay  the same rate  as larger firms.  The
level  of the  new tax  can be set  so that  the tax  change  is  "revenue-neutral;"  in
other words,  it raises  the same total  tax  revenue as the current tax regime.
Using the model to calculate the tax revenues under alternative neutral tax
rates,  it turns out that a rate of 0.197,  levied on all firms,  can generate  the same
tax revenue  as the three-tiered  scheme with zero tax on  self-employed,  0.50 on
firms  with  fewer  than  5  employees,  and  0.56  on  firms  with  more  than  5
employees.  This  is clearly  a  "large"  change  in  tax  rates.  Larger  firms  face  a
dramatic  reduction in taxes  as the burden  is shifted  to the self-employed.
In general,  such a policy can be expected to have several effects:  first, on
the  momentary  size distribution of firms  and  on momentary  efficiency;  second,
on the momentary distribution of earnings;  and third,  on the dynamic  trajectory
of the economy.  It is useful  to examine  each of these  in turn.
5.2.1  Effects on efficiency  and the momentary  size distribution of firms
Ex ante, it seems clear that by reducing the share of the tax burden borne
by  larger  firms,  a shift to neutral  taxes  should  increase  the size and  number  of
large firms,  while drawing  many of the self-employed  into the paid labor force.
Figure 3  illustrates this effect by comparing the present size distribution of firms
with the model's prediction of the distribution obtained under a neutral tax policy.
The  proportion  of self-employed  drops  dramatically  under  this scenario
from  0.704  of  the  manufacturing  workforce  to  zero.  Once  the  large  tax
advantages  associated  with  self-employment  are  removed,  the  inefficiencies
become  too costly  for entrepreneurs.  Even firms  employing  very few  workers
are more profitable  under  full-time  management.  About 0.43  of the workforce
remains  in firms with fewer than 5 employees,  but these are all operated  by full-
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employee.  Whereas  under  the  distortionary  tax  regime,  full-time  managers
produced only 0.40 of total output, under the neutral tax regime all the economy's
production  comes  from firms  with  full-time  managers.  Firms with  10  or more
employees  go from producing  0.18  of aggregate  output  to producing  0.537  of
total output.
The effect on total output is substantial.  By shifting production  into more
efficient  large  firms,  the  neutral  tax  policy  expands  production  dramatically.
With  the same capital  stock,  output nearly doubles from  0.1248 to 0.2304.  This
increase comes with  no direct cost to the economy and should thus be viewed as
a pure  efficiency  gain.  The  message  is  that  highly distortionary  taxes  pose  a
serious  drag on the economy in this  environment.
5.2.2  Effects on distribution
One  question  that  might arise  under  the new  tax  regime  is  whether  the
neutral regime has undesirable distributional  effects.  In particular,  as production
shifts away  from self-employment  into  larger production  units,  does the income
distribution worsen?  Or do increases  in the wage  rate offset the loss of rents?
There  are  a  number  of  ways  to  measure  distribution  in  the  model
economy.  A  commonly  used  measure  is  the  Gini  coefficient.  This  is
straightforward  to  compute  for  the  model  economy.  For  the  model  with
distortionary taxes, the Gini coefficient  is 0.7035.  For the economy with neutral
taxes,  the Gini  coefficient is 0.6735.  Lower numbers  imply greater equality  in
the distribution  of income.  Thus,  perhaps  surprisingly,  the change  to a  neutral
tax regime actually leads to a modest increase in income equality.  The reason for
this  is that wages  rise,  and the  number of people managing  large  firms actually
falls.  This  suggests  that  the  change  in  tax  policy  will  not  have  negative
distributional  consequences;  on the contrary,  it  leads to an improvement  in  this
dimension  as well.38.
5.2.3  Dynamic effects  of tax  reform
In this model,  the effects of the shift to a neutral tax can be followed over
time,  as  the  economy  moves  along  a  growth  trajectory.  In  the  simple
environment  used here,  the  economy  moves  to  a  steady  state  over  a period  of
years.  The model  suggests that  under current  tax policies,  abstracting from any
technical  change or other exogenous  events,  the Ghanaian economy  would attain
a steady  state value  of capital  in  22 years,  with  production  roughly  double the
current  level.  The  increased  production  would  result  entirely  from  capital
accumulation;  in  this  framework,  I abstract  from  changes  in  human  capital  or
entrepreneurial  skills.
By contrast,  a shift to a neutral  tax regime - given the parameters  used
here - would immediately lead  to a level of output higher  than the steady state
value  attained  under current policies.  In  other words,  the efficiency  gain from
tax reform  would be greater than the entire benefit from two decades  of capital
accumulation.
Moreover,  the  neutral  tax  regime  shifts  upwards  the  entire  growth
trajectory of the economy.  Figure 4 shows the path of capital accumulation under
the two tax scenarios; Figure 5 shows the growth trajectories for production under
the two  alternatives.  It  is apparent  from  Figure 5 that the tax reform  generates
an immediate efficiency gain and also that the economy attains a steady state level
of production that is also double the level attained under the distorted tax regime.
In addition,  the  long-term  rate of growth  (from  Year  1 to  Year  22)  is
higher  under  the neutral  tax regime,  since higher  proportions of investment  are
attained.  This is reflected  in the steeper growth  trajectory shown  in Figure 5,  or
it  can  be  measured  as  the  average  annual  compound  growth  rate  from  initial
output  level  to  steady  state  output  level:  the  distorted  tax  scenario  produces
average  annual  compound  growth  rate  of 2.58  percent,  while  the  neutral  tax
scenario generates  average growth of 3.31  percent. 2
23It is of course misleading to use average annual growth rates here, since the growth trajectory
is exponential.  Initial growth rates are very  high, but the economy approaches  the steady  state with
very low growth.Fig.  4:  Capital  Accumulation
Distorted  vs.  Neutral  Taxes
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The  steady  state  distributions  of firms  and  workers  look  much  like  the
initial  distributions.  Although  capital  accumulation  has  some  tendency  to
concentrate production in a smaller number of establishments (as shown by Lucas
1978),  this effect is small relative to other changes  in the economy.  Thus,  Figure
6 shows  the steady  state distribution  of firms  under  the distorted  tax policy  and
the neutral  tax policy, compared  to the original  distribution.
5.3  Conclusions of the policy experiment
The  effects  of this  policy  experiment  are  dramatic.  This  experiment
suggests  that a  shift to a  neutral  tax regime  would  lead to  an  immediate  near-
doubling  of output  due  entirely  to  increased  efficiency  and  productivity.  The
gains from the tax reform would persist and  even increase over time.  Although
there is a modest cost in terms of heightened  inequality,  this would appear to be
overshadowed by  the gains in productivity.
5.4  Sensitivity of the model
The results  attained  here depend  both on the structure of the model  and
on the parameters  and scenarios  used.  The structure  of the model  implies that
a  shift  to  a  neutral  tax  scheme  will  lead  to  reduction  or  elimination  of self-
employment  combined  with  an  increase  in  overall  productivity.  This  occurs
because  the  model  defines  single-person  establishments  to  be  slightly  less
productive  than  other  establishments,  barring  distortions  in  the  tax  rate.
Moreover,  the  model  implies  that  concentration  of  production  in  firms  with
higher-ability entrepreneurs  will increase the overall productivity  level; a shift to
fewer and larger establishments  will increase  efficiency.
The  magnitude  of  these  changes  depends,  however,  on  the  particular
policy scenario and to a limited extent on parameters.  Specifically,  the assumed
levels of taxation in the current policy experiment are responsible for the dramatic



















































parameters appear,  on the basis of preliminary  sensitivity  tests,  to be relatively
insignificant  within  their  plausible  range.  For  example,  p,  0,  'y  and  other
technological  parameters  could vary within moderate ranges  with  little effect on
the  results.  The  parameter  t  already  makes  self-employment  a  reasonably
attractive  option;  changes  in  its  value  would  only  reinforce  the  conclusions
obtained here.
6.  Conclusions  and implications
Several  conclusions  emerge  from  this research.  First,  distortions  in the
structure  of indirect  and  corporate  taxes  have  the potential  to  create  important
effects  on economic  efficiency  and growth.  Under a plausible  set of parameter
values,  the  model  suggests  that  the Ghanaian  economy  would  be benefitted  by
policy changes designed to reduce the bureaucratic and regulatory costs associated
with moving from self-employment  into larger establishments.  Moreover,  these
benefits  - both to individuals  and to the economy - are potentially  large.
A second set of conclusions  involves the usefulness of models of this type.
Although  there are  some problems  in obtaining the necessary  data to apply  such
models to developing countries,  there is a high payoff in using a model that offers
an explicit treatment of firm size and also an explicit dynamic general equilibrium
framework.  Such models open up new classes of problems  for analysis and offer
a valuable  new tool for development policy analysis.
Finally,  these results  point to the  need for improved data concerning  the
costs  of  taxes  and  regulations  facing  firms  of  different  sizes.  The  kind  of
empirical work described by de Soto (1989) can improve the accuracy of models
of this type  and  can thus  lead  to better  prediction  concerning  the  magnitude  of
changes.  Moreover,  other  empirical  work  could  enhance  our understanding  of
the different  costs and  productivity  levels  of different  sized  firms;  clearly,  tax
policies  are  only  one  of  a  number  of  reasons  for  the  high  level  of  self-
employment  in Ghana.41.
6.1  Directions  for  further research
The  results presented  in this paper  depend  to  some  degree  on parameter
choices  and  tax reform  scenarios.  One immediate  direction for  further research
is to carefully examine the sensitivity of model outcomes to alternative parameter
values,  functional  forms,  and parameterizations  of the policy  environment.
This  model  lends  itself well  to answering  questions about  cross-country
phenomena  related  to  the size  distribution of firms.  Why  are small  enterprises
so important  in poor countries relative to rich countries?  How and  why does the
size distribution of firms change as economies  grow?  Why does self-employment
account  for such  a large  proportion of the  labor  force  in  Ghana  relative  to the
United States?  A calibrated  model with  more serious treatment of technological
growth  would offer useful insights  into the changing structure  of production  and
employment  and  could  be  matched  against  cross-country  data.  Specifically,  I
have begun to use this model  to compare Ghana's small-establishment  sector with
those of Mexico  and  the United  States.24
Another  interesting  question  to  ask  is whether  policies  skewing  the  size
distribution  of  firms  have  an  impact  on  an  economy's  ability  to  acquire
technology.  Suppose for example that large firms are better able than small firms
to  gain  access  to  certain  types  of improved  technologies.  Then  policies  that
penalize large  firms might have a negative impact on technology adoption.  This
would imply that distortionary  tax and regulatory policies could have even larger
effects on growth.
More broadly,  there are other classes  of questions  that can be addressed
with this  model.  What are the effects of distortions  in capital  markets on the size
distribution of firms and the growth trajectory?  A large literature (e.g., Aryeetey
et  al.  1994)  suggests  that  in  developing  countries,  formal  financial  institutions
24Lucas  (1978)  showed,  in a static  context,  that as the economy-wide  ratio of capital  to labor
changes,  under reasonable  parameter values,  the wage rises relative to the rental rate of capital  (and
relative to the price of output, which is taken as the num6raire).  This induces people to move, on the
margin,  from  own-account  entrepreneurial  activities  into  the  wage  labor  force.  As  a  result,  the
number of firms in the economy decreases, and the average number of employees per firm increases.
In a  separate  paper  (Gollin,  1995)  I  reproduce  Lucas's  result  in  a dynamic  model,  where  capital
accumulates over time  (and hence causes the capital/labor ratio  to rise).42.
may  not  meet the  needs  of small-scale  establishment,  causing  small  enterprises
and self-employed people to face higher effective rates of interest on borrowing.
A model  of this type could also be used to address  land policy questions,  such  as
the effects  of land  reform  designed  to equalize the  size of establishments  across
individuals.  A  two-sector  version  of  the  model  could  shed  some  light  on
questions of migration and sectoral  change.
The set of research  issues that can be addressed  with a model of this type
is potentially large.  Inital results suggest that this methodology  can contribute to
the understanding  of important policy  questions  for developing  countries.43.
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Appendix
Appendix Table  1:  Proportion  of workforce  consisting of entrepreneurs,
own-account  workers,  and unpaid family laborers:  manufacturing  sector and
entire economy.  Countries  are ordered by  real GDP per  capita.
GDP  Total
per  Manuf.  Labor
Country  Capita'  Sector  Force
Malawi  496  0.825
Central African Rep.  514  0.571  0.834
Nigeria  978  0.780  0.753
Honduras  1385  0.407  0.471
Pakistan  1432  0.389  0.614
Bangladesh  1510  0.792  0.745
Philippines  1689  0.279  0.508
Bolivia  1721  0.502  0.413
Egypt  1869  0.277  0.474
El Salvador  1876  0.399  0.346
Peru  2092  0.249  0.393
Morocco  2173  0.254
Paraguay  2178  0.287  0.305
Botswana  2198  0.286  0.236
Sri Lanka  2215  0.352
Guatemala  2247  0.464  0.504
Ecuador  2830  0.514  0.501
South Africa  3068  0.070
Tunisia  3075  0.302  0.289
Panama  3332  0.232  0.328
Colombia  3380  0.244  0.293
Costa Rica  3569  0.207  0.271
Iran  3685  0.397  0.407
Turkey  3807  0.311  0.573
Poland  3826  0.069  0.259
Brazil  3882  0.127  0.330
Thailand  3942  0.300  0.695
Syria  3994  0.384  0.440
Hungary  4645  0.100  0.133
Chile  4890  0.228  0.296
Uruguay  5185  0.229  0.248
Malaysia  5746  0.156  0.381
Mexico  6253  0.245  0.435
Greece  6783  0.305  0.444
Venezuela  7082  0.204  0.301
Korea,  Rep.  7251  0.156  0.383
Portugal  7478  0.119  0.246
Ireland  9637  0.056  0.196
Spain  9802  0.125  0.214
Israel  9843  0.111  0.166
New Zealand  11363  0.104  0.19149.
Finland  12000  0.055  0.135
Singapore  12653  0.051  0.132
Italy  12721  0.141  0.252
United  Kingdom  12724  0.133  0.106
Austria  12955  0.052  0.135
Netherlands  13281  0.027  0.103
Belgium  13484  0.059  0.162
France  13918  0.049  0.136
Sweden  13986  0.053  0.091
Denmark  14091  0.050  0.102
Australia  14458  0.062  0.149
Germany,  W.  14709  0.044  0.099
Japan  15105  0.119  0.197
Norway  15518  0.029  0.095
Canada  16362  0.016  0.094
Hong  Kong  16471  0.105  0.118
United States  17945  0.019  0.082
Source:  Data on real GDP per capita are taken from the  Penn World
Tables,  Mark  5.6.  Figures are given in constant  dollar terms,  using  1985 as
a base year,  and  following  a  Chain Index.  Data  on labor force structure  are
taken from  International Labor Organization Yearbook,  1993.